We investigated the relationship between guilt proneness and counterproductive work behavior (CWB) using a diverse sample of employed adults working in a variety of different industries at various levels in their organizations. CWB refers to behaviors that harm or are intended to harm organizations or people in organizations. Guilt proneness is a personality trait characterized by a predisposition to experience negative feelings about personal wrongdoing. CWB was engaged in less frequently by individuals high in guilt proneness compared to those low (...) in guilt proneness, controlling for other known correlates of CWB. CWB was also predicted by gender, age, intention to turnover, interpersonal conflict at work, and negative affect at work. Given the detrimental impact of CWB on people and organizations, it may be wise for employers to consider guilt proneness when making hiring decisions. (shrink)

Chapter 6 reports on the findings of the Work Experiences and Character Traits (WECT) project, and into how moral character, personality, emotions, and treatment by managers and coworkers affect how frequently workers engage in ethical and unethical behavior on the job. Over three months, fourteen surveys were administered to more than 1,500 adults living in the United States who worked in a diverse array of occupations in the private and public sectors. Reporting findings that contest situationist perspectives which de-emphasize the (...) importance of individual differences in predicting behavior, the WECT project reveals that individual differences in moral character have consistent, meaningful effects on employees’ work behaviors. (shrink)

Husserlian phenomenology maintains a surprising vitality even in its posthumous condition. Habermas observes, in fact, that unlike structuralism and Marxism, phenomenology has not in the least passed into a post-phase, but is still permeated with lively existentiality. In his philosophical testament, Husserl himself epistemologically engages this condition of phenomenology, seeking its foundation through the essential description of the dynamic of philosophizing and its tradition. Even though Husserl and Fink thus manifest the lived experience of iteration of finality with which the (...) “I” of the individual philosopher, in intrinsic and living intersubjective correlation with all the other philosophers, creatively enriches natural life, they failed to devote attention to the newness this offers to the intuition.Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, in contrast, grasps and draws forth the phenomenon of the ontopoiesis of life that flowers from Husserlian phenomenological intentionality and its developments in Fink, describing it in her phenomenology of life. In the quality of “producer of being” of human creative acts, Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka identifies, as unexplored foundational terrain of phenomenology itself, the “point of contact” with the fountain/source from which the unique and originary poietic flow gushes, which leads being and thinking, nature and consciousness to existence. In this way, pushing the investigation beyond the realm of pure ideas in which Husserl and Fink remained imprisoned, Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka carried out the intuitive re-sowing through which her individual phenomenological initiative was grafted into the very stream of flowing life, bringing to fruit the quality of spontaneous autoproduction of life. A new “Archimedean point” has thus been conquered and upon it each thing can now find its proper place. (shrink)

How can we maintain the reality and significance of human moral concerns in a universe that science has seemingly revealed to be utterly indifferent to us? This paper follows William James’ struggle to answer this question, from his early embrace of his father’s religious monism, through a period of atheistic scientism, to his mature position advocating for belief in a finite God. While James is often read as defending religious faith on pragmatic grounds, I argue instead that his belief can (...) only be understood as part of his lifelong project to recognize evil’s reality and significance. (shrink)

William James argued that certain beliefs require a leap of faith before sufficient evidence becomes available—and his paradigm example of such beliefs is taken from science. Scientific knowledge often begins with a weakly supported and underdeveloped proposal, laden with contrary evidence, and plagued by internal inconsistencies. Consequently, the proposal often garners limited interest. Initially, a novel scientific proposal only appeals to a small group of scientists who instinctually find something in the proposal that strikes them as profoundly right. Motivated by (...) faith, they are convinced that once the hypothesis has been further developed, revised, and its full promise made good on over the course of years or decades of hard work, that their early belief will ultimately be vindicated. The present paper contends that James' "The Will to Believe" justifies religious faith on precisely the same grounds. James' defense of faith is an attempt to apply his views about belief ahead of sufficient evidence in scientific knowledge formation to defend a religious believer's faith. The relationship between belief and evidence when it comes to the religious hypotheses is—as James puts it—analogous to California's gold. California is where one travels to bring gold back from, carrying gold to California is to get matters backwards; likewise, belief is the means of discovering scientific and religious truth, to demand evidence before belief is the wrong way around. (shrink)

It can be said that some concept and theories of anthropological philosophy of a given age usually are a specifical reflection of moral reality of this age. They express, more or less successful, some sort reaction to the main manifestations of moral life and moral culture of relevant age. In aur times, in post-modern world or “liquid modernity” such role is created, among others, by the philosophy of post-modernism, neopragmatism, existencialism and, in some measure, by phenomenology of life of A.T. (...) Tymieniecka.In this original part of philosophical reflections by A.T. Tymieniecka two statements seems to be most important: (1) We are living in the age of serious cultural crisis, especially the crisis od spirituality and the world of values. In consecvence the moral life and the moral culture are also impacted by the crisis. (2) But the conteporary crisis of morality is not a total crisis, deep and durable, but incomplete and temporary one. In other words – this is not the crisis of morality as such, but a certain “crisis – in – morality” and this is not crisis of ethics as science dealing with morality, but a specific “crisis – in ethics”. It is because that main source of morality is still certain factor embedded in human nature, called as “moral sense” or “moral self” expressed in the activity of moral conscience. (shrink)

For many commentators, Confucian ethics is a kind of virtue ethics. However, there is enough textual evidence to suggest that it can be interpreted as an ethics based on rules, consequentialist as well as deontological. Against these views, I argue that Confucian ethics is based on the roles that make an agent the person he or she is. Further, I argue that in Confucianism the question of what it is that a person ought to do cannot be separated from the (...) question of what it is to be a person, and that the latter is answered in terms of the roles that arise from the network of social relationships in which a person stands. This does not mean that Confucian ethics is unlike anything found in Western philosophy. Indeed, I show that many Western thinkers have advanced a view of ethics similar to the Confucian ethics as I interpret it. (shrink)

Suppose that there are good or morally defensible reasons for not responding truthfully to a question or request for information. Is a lie or a deception better as a means to avoid telling the truth? There are many situations in public and private life in which the answer to this question would serve as a useful moral guide, for instance, clinical situations involving dying patients, educational situations involving young children and personal situations involving close friends. Intuitively, we feel that there (...) is a moral asymmetry in favor of deceiving over lying. However, doubts have been cast on such intuition. The aim of this paper is to bolster this intuition. It will be argued that the claim of moral asymmetry in favor of deception can be supported on a consideration of the different degrees of expectation involved in communicative ethics. Two other objections to the claim of asymmetry will also be considered. (shrink)

How is the Confucian moral agent motivated to do what he or she judges to be right or good? In western philosophy, the answer to a question such as this depends on whether one is an internalist or externalist concerning moral motivation. In this article, I will first interpret Confucian ethics as role-based ethics and then argue that we can attribute to Confucianism a position on moral motivation that is neither internalist nor externalist but somewhere in between. I will then (...) illustrate my claim with my reading of Mencius 6A4, showing that it is superior to readings found in the literature, which typically assume that Mencius is an internalist. (shrink)

Conventional particle theories such as the Standard Model have a number of freely adjustable coupling constants and mass parameters, depending on the symmetry algebra of the local gauge group and the representations chosen for the spinor and scalar fields. There seems to be no physical principle to determine these parameters as long as they stay within certain domains dictated by the renormalization group. Here however, reasons are given to demand that, when gravity is coupled to the system, local conformal invariance (...) should be a spontaneously broken exact symmetry. The argument has to do with the requirement that black holes obey a complementarity principle relating ingoing observers to outside observers, or equivalently, initial states to final states. This condition fixes all parameters, including masses and the cosmological constant. We suspect that only examples can be found where these are all of order one in Planck units, but the values depend on the algebra chosen. This paper combines findings reported in two previous preprints (G. ’t Hooft in arXiv:1009.0669 [gr-qc], 2010; arXiv:1011.0061 [gr-qc], 2010) and puts these in a clearer perspective by shifting the emphasis towards the implications for particle models. (shrink)

A well organized introductory book which classifies its readings by schools of thought. Classical Realism, Idealism, Naturalism, Positivism, Analytic Philosophy, and Existentialism are represented.--A. A. T.

Shaffer takes a tour of some perennial questions in this lucid and simply written primer. How do I know I am not dreaming? How does reality differ from a dream? How can we be certain of our knowledge? Varying viewpoints are briefly summarized. The fallibilist view that even a priori mathematical truths and first person reports of feelings and perceptions are subject to error is examined, as is the anti-fallibilist reply that the theoretical possibility of error, without actual evidence, is (...) not sufficient to disturb the certainty of certain kinds of knowledge. Our knowledge of the external world is questioned by Berkeleyan idealism, which treats matter as nothing but a perception of our minds, and by phenomenalism, which treats material objects as nothing but collections of sense data. Opposed to these views are causal theories, which view physical objects as existing independently of observers, and sense data as the result of the causal interaction of material objects and particular bodies. It should be noted that the book's format requires such drastic foreshortening of Descartes' and Berkeley's views that its characterization of the former's system as "one of the great achievements in man's intellectual history" is in no way confirmed by the textual references. Other questions discussed in lively fashion are the self ; identity theory ; epiphenomenalism ; and interactionism. Is the mind best defined as the collection of mental events one has during a lifetime? If these events are all connected with the same body, the mind seemingly cannot survive the death of the body. Finally, theistic and atheistic views about the meaning of life are compared, with the Aristotelian view of teleological causation as the common denominator. The book asks many questions, provides few answers, but serves as an enticement to further exploration.--A. T. (shrink)

Singer's study of the technical problems of Santayana's systematic thought will not satisfy his friends nor his detractors. Her reduction of Santayana's Lucretian materialism to epiphenomenalism will seem inadequate to the former. The latter may see Santayana as merely technically inept. While Singer does not claim to offer a comprehensive study of Santayana's thought, her theses " that Santayana was a naturalist and a materialist in the same sense and on the same grounds throughout; that despite even radical changes in (...) terminology his 'later' ontology is a development of, and not inconsistent with, his 'earlier' philosophy; and that, nevertheless, from the start his materialism was touched with ambiguity", do need a comprehensive understanding of Santayana's materialism. The "ambiguities" of his materialism and his social theory in Dominations and Powers derive from the ontological complexities of his realms of Being. Santayana plays with the perspectives possible from each realm and Singer sometimes misses his viewpoint. Santayana's challenge to the liberalism of democracy is indeed based on his a-teleological materialism. Singer's study does draw attention to the analogy of the individual to the state implicit in Santayana's philosophy; she offers refutations of M. K. Munitz's theory of "early and "late" Santayana and W. K. Dennes' interpretation of Santayana's materialism.--A. T. (shrink)

Methods developed in a previous paper are employed to define an exact correspondence between the states of a deterministic cellular automaton in 1+1 dimensions and those of a bosonic quantum field theory. The result may be used to argue that quantum field theories may be much closer related to deterministic automata than what is usually thought possible.

It is often supposed that Confucianism is opposed to the idea of equality insofar as the key ideals to which it is committed, such as meritocracy and li , are incompatible with equality. Sympathetic commentators typically defend Confucianism by saying that (a) the Confucian person is not a free-standing individual but a social being embedded in a social structure with different and unequal roles, and (b) social inequality has to be traded in for other values. This paper argues that in (...) advocating meritocracy, Confucianism does not abandon the idea of equality. Indeed, invoking Aristotle's account of equality in the Nicomachean Ethics , it can be argued that the unequal distribution of rights and benefits reflects one aspect of equality, namely the vertical aspect, or the unequal treatment of unequals. (shrink)

Kant says that ideas have to be linked with sense experience to be meaningful. Rational ideas can be so linked via the "symbolical process" which is a process of creating a similarity (in rules of application) between an idea and its symbol. In this process the imagination goes beyond a concept (which is already linked with sense experience) to another concept in order to say something about the latter. This turns out to be the metaphorical process. For in every metaphor (...) there is an idea that receives expression in another, The latter already meaningful (i.E., Having a literal meaning). (shrink)

Why did Levinas choose Isaiah 45:7 (“I make peace and create evil: I the Lord do all that”) as a superscription of his essay on evil? This article explores the role of evil in Levinas's religious ethics. The author discusses the structure of evil as revealed phenomenologically and juxtaposes it to the structure of subjectivity found in the writings of Levinas. The idea of the “ethical anthropic principle”, modeled upon the cosmic anthropic principle, is then used to link evil to (...) the responsibility of the subject. The link is subsequently extended to God. This is proposed as one way of understanding the meaning of Isaiah 45:7. (shrink)

Transoral laser microsurgery applies to the piecemeal removal of malignant tumours of the upper aerodigestive tract using the CO2 laser under the operating microscope. This method of surgery is being increasingly popularised as a single modality treatment of choice in early laryngeal cancers (T1 and T2) and occasionally in the more advanced forms of the disease (T3 and T4), predomi- nantly within the supraglottis. Thomas Kuhn, the American physicist turned philosopher and historian of science, coined the phrase ‘paradigm shift’ in (...) his groundbreaking book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. He argued that the arrival of the new and often incompatible idea forms the core of a new paradigm, the birth of an entirely new way of thinking. This article discusses whether Steiner and col- leagues truly brought about a paradigm shift in oncological surgery. By rejecting the principle of en block resection and by replacing it with the belief that not only is it oncologically safe to cut through the substance of the tumour but in doing so one can actually achieve better results, Steiner was able to truly revolutionise the man- agement of laryngeal cancer. Even though within this article the repercussions of his insight are limited to the upper aerodigestive tract oncological surgery, his willingness to question other peoples’ dogma makes his contribution truly a genuine paradigm shift. (shrink)

It is commonly supposed that people of Asia, particularly the ethnic Chinese, subscribe to values which are not conducive to economic progress. The gap between the capitalist West and Asia is often attributed to the 'cultural' factor. Behind such perception is the supposition that capitalism is wholly a product of the West, alien to Asia and cannot be successfully embraced without doing violence to its cultural traditions. Against this position, I argue that classical capitalism is perfectly compatible with the key (...) elements of Chinese philosophy. Whether or not there is anything in the suggestion of some historians that Quesnay borrowed from Confucianism, I argue that his economic doctrine could have developed from the fundamentals of Chinese philosophy. If I am right, the economic gap between the West and Asia has to be explained in terms other than the 'cultural' factor, such as, perhaps, colonialism and post-colonialist ideologies. (shrink)

Superstring theory is an extension of conventional quantum field theory that allows for stringlike and branelike material objects besides pointlike particles. The basic foundations on which the theory is built are amazingly shaky, and, equally amazingly, it seems to be this lack of solid foundations to which the theory owes its strength. We emphasize that such a situation is legitimate only in the development phases of a new doctrine. Eventually, a more solidly founded structure must be sought.Although it is advertised (...) as a “candidate theory of quantum gravity”, we claim that string theory may not be exactly that. Rather, just like quantum field theory itself, it is a general mathematical framework for a class of theories. Its major flaw could be that it still embraces a Copenhagen view on the relation between quantum mechanics and reality, while any “theory of everything”, that is, a theory for the entire cosmos, should do better than that. (shrink)

A survey which views philosophical positions as the result of the conflict of the "Vital Instinct," and the "Instinct of Knowledge." The latter, it turns out, is always in the end the pawn of the former.--A. A. T.

A biologist attempts to solve "the problem of knowledge" by exposing the Great Illusion of Philosophy: confusing seeing with the seen. --A. T. T.

The development of Plato's dialectical method is traced through a number of dialogues. Beginning with the Meno, the evolution of a "pre-critical" dialectic ending with the Phaedo is considered. This first dialectic is described as an ascending or inductive movement from sensible things, through which the Forms are apprehended intuitively and independently. The problem of the mutual participation of the Forms, and of sensible things in them, occasions a growing crisis which comes to a head in the first part of (...) the Parmenides, where, according to Montes, the inadequacy of such a dialectic is established. The second part of that dialogue is then interpreted as an exercise in a new "critical dialectic," which is to be applied later in the Sophist to a rational deduction of the Forms in which the problems of participation are overcome. As might be expected of a work originally in thesis form, the book is heavy with footnotes, references, and Greek quotations, making for cumbersome reading.--A. T. (shrink)

In Confucius' time, it was supposed that the sovereign had the mandate of heaven (tianming) to rule. Both Confucius and Mencius speak of a legitimate ruler as someone who has such a mandate and of a deposed ruler as someone who has lost it. Commentators have recently turned their attention to what the reference to the mandate of heaven means, as there are implications for the prospects of democracy in a Confucian state. The result is a wide spectrum of views. (...) In what might be called the liberal interpretation of the "mandate of heaven," Confucianism, or Mencius more specifically, allows for a popular revolt against a despotic ruler (hence for the possibility of democracy). In what might be called the conservative .. (shrink)

In the following paper I am not going to deal with psychiatry in the traditional sense, but with what psychiatry is dealing with. Or, more precisely; with what psychiatry ought to be dealing with.Freud’s psychoanalysis has both been influential for, and been influated by existential philosophy in the twentieth century. Freud’s attitude towards philosophy was deeply ambivalent – he both rejected most of philosophy as being forms of sublimation, and regarded rationalism as a defensive strategy relative to the alienating primary (...) processes of the unconscious. But Freud’s own meta-psychology, as ex. in the Jenseits des Lustprinzips – may be read as a genuine attempt in existential phenomenology. Given that Freud’s psychoanalysis has contributed strongly to the configuration of modern subjectivity, a philosophical, phenomenological analysis of Freud may elucidate deep a historicity of modern subjectivity.My efforts in this paper are twofold; first I try to demonstrate how Freud’s theory bears heavily upon classical thinking of our tradition. I claim that Freud was in fact re-collecting, or even maintaining a deep current in the Western humanistic tradition, hinting to unruly powers of a an un-personal “Will” constantly pressing on to break free. Freud’s originality thus lye less in conceiving new ideas, than in demonstrating unthought-of dimensions and consequences in ex. Kant’s model of the mind. Thus Freud is able to see a rudimentary theory of psychopathology already described by the tradition.Secondly, and this is my main point in this paper, is that that Freud in fact ordered a phenomenological-hermeneutical interpretation of his own work, and if read in this perspective, a new horizon opens for psychoanalysis. To achieve this I will demonstrate an often overlooked resemblance of Freud’s theory of the unconscious and Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology of the “will” (as in HUA XV), which may then be seen as a genuine motivational theory of the Self.My interpretative suggestion is that Freud wanted to explicate deep, existential consequences of an uncanny knowing in the Self of both being the source of its enduring existence – and at the same time having the notion of not being its own origin. The Self, therefore, has an aporetical, almost irrealizing appearance to it’s Self, hence being under a constant pressure of ontological inconstancy, which may upsurge as profound psychical irruptions, witch may be labelled “pathological”.In conclusion I argue that the main lack in psychoanalysis is a fuller theory of constitution, which Husserl’s phenomenology perhaps may provide. I suggest a thorough phenomenological re-reading of Freud, in order to provide a potent theoretical contribution to psychopathological research. (shrink)

While it is no simple matter to face the crisis of current psychology, alienated as it is by reductionism, naturalism, and epistemological misunderstandings that dangerously simplify man’s lived experience and complexity, it is nevertheless vital to re-found psychology itself so it may engage in the decisive task of studying man, proposing solutions, and engaging in interventions. The contribution of the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl, Edith Stein, Max Scheler, and others, as well as that of the existential philosophy of Søren Kierkegaard, (...) Karl Jaspers, Gabriel Marcel, and Maria Zambrano, often ignored in the sphere of psychology, can finally help psychological research today to propose a new objectivity born of intersubjectivity and of transcendental subjectivity in order to return to things themselves, man’s lived experience, and the essence of being human in the world, even when human existence is in a condition of shipwreck. This is the challenge that today’s psychologists must confront in their work, setting themselves as witnesses to their own credibility in research and in their relationships with patients. Thus this paper presents current studies in phenomenological and existential psychology in Italy and proposes some existential coordinates as universal and essential structures. (shrink)

Kant claims in the religion that morality leads ineluctably and inevitably to religion. I argue that a moral agent can resist the movement towards religion and still remain moral. My strategy differs from many found in the literature insofar as I do not believe we need to attack the notion of the highest good. I argue instead that the promotion of the highest good can be a moral duty for a rational nonbeliever.

It is possible to say that there have been ambivalent approaches regarding Omar's practices arising from the irregularities in the last two centuries. He is sometimes portrayed as a reformist acting differently from the way in the Quran and practices of the Prophet. Indeed, it is desired to establish a basis for legitimacy that such an attitude can be exhibited against the Quran and the Prophet. Moreover, it can be said that through this approach, it is aimed to make some (...) people’s conception of religion based on the Islamic ground through Omar. The most common examples given claiming the changes in time and circumstances are that Omar did not apply hand cutting punishment for the crime of theft despite the apparent related verse and not distribute the Sevâd land. On the other hand, it is asserted that it is obligatory to be contingent up on the practice of the Prophet, claiming that Omar behaved unlike in the case of three talaq divorces. In both approaches, it is pre-accepted that, Omar adopted different practices from Prophet’s. Studies conducted in the area related to Omar practices are the studies carried out according to their own perspectives in order to prove the suitability of Omar applications to the Qur'an. In addition to these valuable works, the echo of the Omar practices in the sects from the first period is an important step that needs to be addressed in the first place. This study investigates how the sects dealt with Omar practices and how they comment these practices. (shrink)

The daring and problematic aim of the present study is to address and survey the development and the contribution of phenomenology in several fields since the beginning of the last century to date.1 Focusing on phenomenology, with an intending look in a phenomenological way, that is “phenomenology reflects upon itself”,2 is what this study is about; all the more challenging due to our lack of a strong experience in the field. We may well be in a disadvantaged position, but still (...) it is a good starting point in order to understand the whole phenomenological process. Not to be forgotten is that, as Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka3 and Daniela Verducci4 stressed, grasping the entire process of phenomenology is nearly impossible due to the great power and to the disseminating action that phenomenology exercises on several often unexplored fields of contemporary culture. (shrink)

Matter interacting classically with gravity in 3+1 dimensions usually gives rise to a continuum of degrees of freedom, so that, in any attempt to quantize the theory, ultraviolet divergences are nearly inevitable. Here, we investigate matter of a form that only displays a finite number of degrees of freedom in compact sections of space-time. In finite domains, one has only exact, analytic solutions. This is achieved by limiting ourselves to straight pieces of string, surrounded by locally flat sections of space-time. (...) Globally, however, the model is not finite, because solutions tend to generate infinite fractals. The model is not (yet) quantized, but could serve as an interesting setting for analytical approaches to classical general relativity, as well as a possible stepping stone for quantum models. Details of its properties are explained, but some problems remain unsolved, such as a complete description of the most violent interactions, which can become quite complex. (shrink)

This article is dedicated to possibility of overcoming the subject-object ontology, which is based on intentionality. The author proves that such dualism is rooted into the transcendental level. The transcendental level makes possible our empirical experience on the basis of subject-object relations. The author considers Parmenides’ famous sentence “For it is the same thing that can be thought and that can be” and Husserl’s well-known claim “Back to things themselves!” as essential for possibility of discovering non-intentional relation between Self and (...) Other, between human being and nature/cosmos. There are the division and the rupture between subject and object in a natural attitude. Parmenides and early Husserl show the way to the truth as a wholeness without subject and object. (shrink)

The question of normality is much broader than that of the possibility of elimination or prevention of mental disturbances. In its essence it is the question of possibilities for creating the most favourable conditions for human life. We enquire into normality as an endless process of mans self-creation and his reshaping of the world. Creative activity, constant over-reaching, openness toward the future, seeking the truth, the possibility of choice and free decision belongs to the specific characteristics of the human species, (...) and hence to the essence of human normality, as well. (shrink)

My paper proposes to do two things. First I wish to sketch out some fundamental characteristics in what phenomenology actually was as an investigative program as its first 30 years, that is, as Husserl’s work came to a culmination. Then I shall argue for the way these pivotal issues had been in principle radi-cally reframed in phenomenology’s achievements, even if this reframing was little recognized (with some exceptions) in the subsequent philosophic interpretation of Edmund Husserl’s writings. These issues are, then, (...) the ones I shall suggest have to be recognized and taken up in their full scope if phenomenology is to continue at the depth and with the richness that it had developed by the time Husserl was facing his own death.I shall propose four themes as indices of the most probing analyses made in the final years of Husserl’s life), the full implications of which are yet to be drawn: 1. the radical sui generis status of sense (Sinn) in the investigation of phenomena; 2. the need for an uncompromising questioning and overcoming of the nature-spirit dichotomy; 3. careful assessment and realization of the lessons of the genetic analysis that lies in the phenomenology of ultimate temporalization (Zeitigung), for it is only with the reintegration of the results of this analysis in all previous studies that the full meaning of those studies and their findings can be realized; and finally 4. careful theoretical critique of the limits in phenomenology’s investigative program and adherence to the way that critique affects the comprehensive philosophical interpretations of phenomenology’s findings; for without realizing what phenomenological principles are in principle capable of reaching validly and adequately, one cannot deal philosophically with the ultimate understanding of phenomenology’s achievements. The investigation and interpretation of none of these has been fully carried out, either by Husserl or by those who came after him. It is still left to be done. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the article “Developing a Dialogical Platform for Disseminating Research through Design” by Abigail C. Durrant, John Vines, Jayne Wallace & Joyce Yee. Upshot: The experimental conference format described by Durrant et al. is intended to create an open platform for dissemination and knowledge creation. The field of open design, in which designers create structures to support creative action by others, offers relevant insights and alternative approaches. For example: while it is logical to see openness as open (...) choice, it can be productive to instead think of openness as constructed through a balance of structure and choice. (shrink)

The paper aims at showing the necessity of a sound anthropological and ethical foundation of economics. In this framework it is also discussed whether Phenomenology can contribute to a renewed interpretation of economic and ethical issues and, in particular, of the relationship between ethics and economics. More specifically, the phenomenological approach is taken into account with regard to its contribution to the development of a complex and dynamic idea of personhood, which relies on the notion of human flourishing and underlies (...) the relationship between ethics and economics. (shrink)

The ijtihâd issues are among important problems of uṣûl al-fiqh (Islamic legal theory). Given al-beyân el-ijtihâd in the meaning of interpreting naṣṣ (text) and al-qiyâs el-jtihâd in the meaning of reaching a verdict of a new issue which is not determined by naṣṣ, it is possible to say that mujtahid (a jurist) is actively in the ijtihâd activity. Thus, the ijtihâd issues has been discussed in uṣûl al-fiqh since early period. The fact that Shâfi‘î refers to ijtihâd issues in his (...) works which have arrived the present day shows that there is a rich accumulation of knowledge about ijtihâd discussions in early period. After Shâfi‘î, the issues were discussed by scholars of Islamic legal theory. Among the Shâfi‘î (uṣûl al-fiqh) works which have arrived the present day, the first work that deals with ijtihâd issues in an ordered, systematic and detailed way is the work of al-Mâwerdî’s el-Ḥâvi’l-Kebîr. In this study, al-Mâwerdî discusses many issues in uṣûl al-fiqh, especially the definition of ijtihâd, its types, the relation between ijtihad and qıyâs, the qualities of mujtahid, iṣâbet (right) and ḫaṭâ’ (fault) in ijtihâd and the provision of ijtihâd. The debates on the ijtihâd issues in Shâfi‘î uṣûl al-fiqh before al-Mâverdî are important our subject. al-Mâwerdî’s view of uṣûl has a close relationship with the accumulation of uṣûl developed prior to him. al-Mâwerdî mentions the views of many scholars who have contributed the accumulation of the sect in the ijtihad issues, especially Shâfi‘î. He refers to the views of scholars from sects other than Shâfi‘î in the issues he discussed. From this point of view, it is certain that to determine the ijtihâd issues in al-Mâwerdî’s el-Ḥâvi’l-Kebîr will also help us to determine the framework and course of debates on ijtihâd in the classical period. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:26. DAVID HUME ON REASON, PASSIONS AND MORALS Perhaps the most notorious passage in Hume's Treatise is the one that concerns the relative roles of reason and passions, where he says: Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions (T 415). This psychology of action is the foundation of Hume's moral theory, wherein we find his two other notorious dicta, one being!.¡oral distinctions cannot be (...) derived from reason, and the other, Ought cannot be derived from is. Many commentators have interpreted Hume as saying that reason plays no role in the making of moral judgments, and, while not taking the rationalistic line, criticized him for not giving reason its proper due. The aim of this paper is to show that Hume's primary concern is to argue against the rationalist position which takes reason to be sufficient (always or sometimes) to move one to act, and to give rise to moral judgments. I wish to show that Hume is only concerned with dismissing the claim that reason could be a sufficient condition, not that it is a necessary one. Indeed, Hume could be interpreted as saying that reason is no less important than passions in shaping human conduct, anc in the area of inorai conduct, there can be no moral judgments without the work of reason. At the same time, however, passions remain the prime mover; reason does not move us to act (generally, hence morally). 1 shall try to show that the dictum '¿¡oral distinctions cannot be derived from reason' is essentially correct, but its being correct in no way shows that reason is not a necessary element of moral distinctions. 27. Before discussing the views of some critics of Hume's moral theory, it is important to clear up one source of misunderstanding that lies in Hume's discussion of the psychology of action. When Hume says that reason is the slave of passions, he does not say thereby that reason is unimportant. He is saying merely that reason alone does not move one to act. The force that propels one to action is the passion, whether it be love, or anger, or pride, or envy, or fear, or desire. Reason alone does not provide the motive. However, it is reason that does the groundwork, analyzing facts, perceiving relations, and drawing conclusions, all of which go to determine which action to perform, but the action will not be performed unless one of the passions is also present. Just because reason is the slave does not indicate that its work is not relevant. To extend the slavery metaphor, we may observe that slave owners supported slavery for the very reason that the slave's work was found indispensable; analogously, it must be observed that Hume is most unlikely to hole that reason plays no part in human action. To complete the analogy, we should say that while much could be achieved with slaves, it was the masters who conceived the plan, and the masters must rank higher in the causal order. We may observe further that greater achievement could be had by treating slaves properly, not overworking them, and not ill-treating them. If reason is the slave, it will be in our interest to cultivate it, sharpen it, and use it always and to the full. This could be inferred from HuTr.e's discussion of the understanding in Book 1 of the Treatise. indeed, in the conclusion of Book I, Hume points out forcefully that we contradict ourselves if we hold that no refin'd or elaborate reasoning is ever to be 28. receiv'd (T 268). For it is only through reasoning that we arrive at any such conclusion. He goes on to say: Very refin'd reflections have little or no influence upon us; and yet we do not, and cannot establish it for a rule, that they ought not to have any influence; which implies a manifest contradiction (T268). There cannot be a clearer demonstration that it is not the case that Hume fails to give reason its proper due. Later, I shall cite further evidence for this in relation specifically to the role of reason in... (shrink)

The pace of globalisation has quickened considerably in the last ten to fifteen years. The process has yielded benefits but also resulted in conflicts. The benefits would be enhanced if the conflicts could be resolved. One source of conflicts is the desire to maintain cultural identity. Can Confucianism contribute to the working out of a universal global justice that can help resolve conflicts, particularly conflicts of cultural identities? Can it be part of the globalisation process without sacrificing its cultural identity? (...) I argue that it can on both counts and thus it is neither a villain blocking the progress of universal justice, a necessary condition for conflict-free globalisation, nor a helpless victim of that progress. (shrink)